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U.S.-THAILAND TRADE DISPUTES:
APPLYING SECTION 301 TO CIGARETTES
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Ted L. McDorman*
INTRODUCTION
In the last few years there have been a number of trade irritants
between Thailand and the United States, but the disputes respecting
Thailand's allegedly lax intellectual property protection and import
ban on cigarettes have been the most interesting and heated.' In the
middle of these two disputes have been U.S. trade law Section 3012
and the threat of U.S. trade retaliation unless Thailand mends its ways
to the satisfaction of the United States.
In the dispute over cigarettes, the United States' use of Section 301
resulted in the United States and Thailand utilizing the third party
* University of Toronto, B.A.; Dalhousie University, LL.B., LL.M.; Associate Professor,
Faculty of Law, and Associate, Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives, University of Victoria, Victo-
ria, British Columbia, Canada. The author wishes to thank Dylan MacLeod for his assistance
and acknowledge the student paper done by Michael Begg, which was of assistance in the section
on pharmaceuticals and patent law.
1. Other prominent disputes between the United States and Thailand occurring recently have
involved textiles and rice. Textiles are a major component of Thailand's exports to the United
States. Only after 30 months of sometimes acrimonious negotiations were the two countries able
to reach a new textile trade agreement to replace the previous deal, which expired in 1988. See
Thai-U.S. Textile Pact Finalized, BANGKOK PosT WKLY. REV., Sept. 13, 1991, at 11; Ratchapol
Laovanitch, New Textile Pact Signed at 11th Hour, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., July 5, 1991,
at 20. See generally SURAKIART SATHIRATHAI, THAILAND AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
31-38 (1987).
Thailand has long been concerned by U.S. farm policies that involve the alleged subsidization
of rice and consequent unfair competition with Thai rice. In early 1991, Thailand protested an
American plan to sell subsidized rice to the Philippines. See Minister Calls For Cuts To U.S. Rice
Subsidies, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Sept. 13, 1991, at 11; Bangkok Files Protest Over U.S.
Rice Exports, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 11, 1991, at 55. See generally SATHIRATHAI, supra, at
15-22; Surakiart Sathirathai & Amman Siamwalla, GA77Law, Agricultural Trade, and Develop-
ing Countries: Lesson from Two Case Studies I WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 595, 604-12 (1987).
2. Section 301 was originally enacted in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
618, § 301, 88 Stat. 2041, 2042-43 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20) (1975).
Through the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 (1988), significant changes were made to the original Section 301 provisions.
It is convenient to identify three separate 301 processes: "Section 301," "Super 301," and
"Special 301." Using Section 301, U.S. petitioners can make complaints about other countries'
unreasonable trade practices which hurt their trade prospects. If these complaints are found to
be justified, the United States can retaliate against the offending country. Super 301 required the
United States Trade Representative (USTR) to prepare an inventory of foreign trade barriers and
attempt to negotiate their removal with the possibility of trade retaliation if the negotiations were
ultimately unsuccessful. Special 301 is similar to Super 301 in its approach, but relates to intel-
lectual property and is a continuing threat. See text accompanying notes 21-76.
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dispute resolution mechanism of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT).3 It was the first time since Thailand became a
member of GATT in 1982 that Thailand was directly involved in the
formal dispute settlement process. The GATT panel formed to look
into the U.S. complaint took the view that Thailand's import restric-
tions on cigarettes were inconsistent with Thailand's GATT obliga-
tions.4 Thailand accepted the decision5 and, despite some reticence,
has moved to alter its laws.6
Regarding the intellectual property issue, use of Section 301 and
Special 301 has put pressure on Thailand to alter its laws and practices
to provide greater protection for the intellectual property rights of
U.S. citizens. While Thailand appears to be attempting to accommo-
date U.S. interests (and demands), it has not yet achieved the results
sought by the United States. In May 1991, Thailand was listed under
Special 301 as a priority country.7 It remains uncertain whether Thai-
land can move far enough and fast enough to appease U.S. interests
and to avoid retaliatory trade action by the U.S. government.
Underlying the current trade disputes between Thailand and the
United States are the overall trade and investment patterns between
the two countries, the geopolitical relationship of the two countries,
the history of these relationships, and the internal political situation in
Thailand.8
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
GATT dispute settlement procedures have evolved through practice. The procedure utilized
is not found in the GATT document itself. Reference must be made to the Understanding Re-
garding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, GAIT Doc. L/4907
(Nov. 28, 1979), reprinted in BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 210 (26th supp.
1980) [hereinafter BISD] and Improvements to the GAT 7Dispute Settlement Rules and Proce-
dures, GATT Doc. L/6489 (Apr. 12, 1989), reprinted in BISD, supra, at 61 (36th supp. 1990).
See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 94-100 (1989); Eric Canal-Forgues &
Rudolf Ostrihansky, New Developments in the GAYT Dispute Settlement Procedures, J. WORLD
TRADE, Apr. 1990, at 67; William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 51 (1987).
4. Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT Doc.
D510/R (Nov. 7, 1980), reprinted in BISD, supra note 3, at 200 (37th supp. 1991) [hereinafter
ThaiL-US. GATTPanel].
5. The GATT Council adopted the Thai-U.S. Panel Report, which makes the Report's con-
clusions binding on both countries. As a member of the GATT council, Thailand could have
delayed the adoption of the Report or effectively vetoed its adoption. Thailand chose not to do
so. Panel Reports on Thai Cigarette Restrictions, 76 Focus: GATT NEWSLETTER, at 1, 4
(1990).
6. See text accompanying notes 120-28.
7. Notice of Countries Identified as Priority Countries, 56 Fed. Reg. 20,060 (U.S. Trade Rep.
1991). Thailand was again listed as a priority country in 1992. USTR Cites India, Taiwan,
Thailand as Worst Intellectual Property Offenders, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at 784 (1992).
8. American Chamber of Commerce in Thailand, Country Paper - Oct 1989 in BUSINESS
AND INVESTMENTS IN THAILAND (Tilleke & Gibbins eds., 1990). This group comments:
Trade disputes now overshadow other bilateral issues between the two countries. The rice
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The United States is the largest foreign investor in Thailand, with
approximately $4 billion dollars worth of investment, although Japan
and Taiwan have been investing larger amounts than the United States
in recent years. In the last few years, the United States has become
Thailand's top export market, accounting for about twenty percent of
Thai exports in 1990. 9 The United States had a trade deficit with
Thailand in 1990 of $2.3 billion.10 In 1989, the Thai company
Unicord acquired the U.S. company Bumble Bee from the Pilsbury
group of companies for $285 million, making Unicord the world's
largest tuna canner.'1 This was the first major Thai takeover of a U.S.
company. The Thai economic growth rate has been phenomenal in
the last decade and the seventh five year plan launched in late 1991
confidently predicts an average annual growth rate of 8.2 percent. 12
The geopolitical relationship between Thailand and the United
States has been close since the Second World War.13 During the Viet-
nam conflict, the United States stationed forces in Thailand and liber-
ally provided military and non-military aid. 14 In the intervening
period, U.S. disengagement has cooled the relationship, and U.S. for-
eign policy shifts have caused Thailand to reassess its strategic posi-
tion and friends. However, the strategic relationship between the
United States and Thailand is a continuing fact in the overall relations
between the two countries.' 5
bill provision of the Farm Act, the removal of certain GSP privileges, the threat of Section
301 sanctions due to IPR issues, Countervailing Duty (CVD) assessments on Thai manufac-
tured mini ball bearings, and market access limitations for U.S. cigarettes have significantly
strained Thai-U.S. economic relations.
9. Thailand in World Trade, 83 Focus: GATT NEWSLETTER 4 (1991).
10. The United States exported $3.0 billion and imported $5.3 billion in merchandise. U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1991 NAT'L TRADE ESTIMATES REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BAR-
RIERS 213 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 NAT'L TRADE ESTIMATES].
11. Off The Hook; FAR E. ECON. REV., May 23, 1991, at 48; Row of Canneries, FAR E.
ECON. REV., May 23, 1991, at 50.
12. Economic Expansion, Stability Are The Focus of the Seventh Plan, BANGKOK POST
WKLY. REV., Sept. 20, 1991, at 18.
13. See generally R. SEAN RANDOLPH, THE UNITED STATES AND THAILAND: ALLIANCE
DYNAMICS, 1950-85 (1986). See also UNITED STATES - THAILAND RELATIONS (Karl D. Jack-
son & Wiwat Mungkandi eds., 1986); THAILAND - U.S. RELATIONS: CHANGING POLITICAL,
STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC FACTORS (Ansil Ramsay & Wiwat Mungkandi eds., 1988).
14. RANDOLPH, supra note 13, at 49-125.
15. Id. at 223-31. The author comments at 229:
The current security linkage between the United States and Thailand appears firmly rooted
in the domestic political realities of both countries and so has achieved greater political
sustainability. While the Thais continue to seek the strongest possible security guarantee
from the United States, a working recognition now exists that the U.S. role must remain
limited. American respect for Thai nationalism has increased, and the U.S. Embassy's range
of contacts in the Thai government and society has been significantly broadened....
Trade and economic relations, though still clearly secondary to security and political
issues, have assumed new importance in the Thai-American relationship, as Thailand's sus-
tained record of economic growth (together with that of ASEAN as a whole) in the 1970s
[V/ol. 14:90
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The internal political situation in Thailand has come to involve a
subtle balance between elected politicians, the military, business and
educated elites in Bangkok, government bureaucracy, public opinion,
and the constitutional monarchy.16 The 1980s were characterized by
Thai-style democracy, with increased civilian involvement in the di-
rect ruling of Thailand. However, in early 1991 a military coup re-
moved the civilian government.1 7 The action of the military received
little condemnation within Thailand and did not involve significant
repression. 18 The military leaders moved quickly to install a highly
respected and competent civilian government.19 However, following
the March 1992 elections, the majority coalition selected coup-leader
General Suchinda Kraprayoon as prime minister. This continuing
and direct military involvement in civilian politics proved unaccept-
able to the Bangkok populace. Widespread demonstrations and a
bloody military confrontation forced General Suchinda from office.
The interim Prime Minister, pending September elections, is again
Anand Panyarachun. 20
and early 1980s has propelled it toward the ranks of the middle-income countries. Average
GNP growth through this period has exceeded 7 percent.
He concludes at 231: "[IThe partnership that exists today is an increasingly balanced and mature
one, premised on a realistic appraisal of domestic and international conditions and on an endur-
ing heritage of friendship and shared national interests."
16. See CHARLES F. KEYES, THAILAND: BUDDHIST KINGDOM AS MODERN NATION-
STATE 86-150 (1989); JOSEPH J. WRIGHT, THE BALANCING ACT: A HISTORY OF MODERN
THAILAND 262-318 (1991). For a general discussion of Thai politics, see JOHN L.S. GIRLING,
THAILAND: SOCIETY AND POLITICS (1981); DAVID MORELL & CHAI-ANAN SAMUDAVANIJA,
POLITICAL CONFLICT IN THAILAND: REFORM, REACTION, REVOLUTION (1981); Clark D. Ne-
her, Thailand, in POLITICS IN THE ASEN STATES 13-15 (Diane K. Mauzy ed., 1984); GOVERN-
MENT AND POLITICS OF THAILAND (Somsakdi Xuto ed., 1987).
17. The Day of the Generals, ASIAWEEK, Mar. 8, 1991, at 43-47; Popular Putsch, FAR E.
ECON. REV., Mar. 7, 1991, at 17-19; Seventeenth Time Unlucky, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 1991,
at 33-34. Since 1932, the end of the absolute monarchy in Thailand, coups have been a popular
manner in which to change governments. The 1991 coup was the seventeenth coup-attempt
since 1932 and followed unsuccessful coups in 1981 and 1985. The numerous coup and coup-
attempts are listed in WRIGHT, supra note 16, at 320-23 and are discussed fully in the sources
cited in note 16.
18. As one journalist wrote "...this coup proved to be different from the military power
grabs of the past - it was widely accepted, almost popular." Popular Putsch, supra note 17, at
17.
The perception was that Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan's government had become
too corrupt and that a campaign was underway to discredit the military leadership. The military
coup leaders provided these and several other justifications for their action. See The Day of the
Generals, supra note 17, at 43-47; Seventeenth Time Unlucky, supra note 17, at 33-34.
19. The military selected Anand Panyarachun, businessman and former high-ranking diplo-
mat, as Prime Minister. This choice, as well as the composition of the cabinet, was designed to
show the good faith of the military in restoring civilian rule. The choice of Anand proved to be a
shrewd move. See Rodney Tasker, Under Licence, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 21, 1991, at 13;
Junta's Choice, But His Own Man, ASIAWEEK, Mar. 15, 1991, at 32.
20. Concerning the post-March 1992 events, see Election To Be Held On Sept. 13, BANGKOK
POST WKLY. REV., July 10, 1992, at 1; Rodney Tasker, The Ringmaster Returns, FAR E. ECON.
REV., June 25, 1992, at 8; Paul Handley, Rainbow Coalition, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 4, 1992,
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Irrespective of the close economic and strategic relationship be-
tween Thailand and the United States, the United States has utilized
Section 301 (and Special 301), and the consequent threat of trade re-
taliation, in its relations with the Land of Smiles. The purpose of this
article is to examine the operation of Section 301 and Special 301 re-
garding trade in cigarettes and intellectual property.
SECTION 301
Overview
In simple terms, Title III, Chapter 1, of the Trade Act of 197421
(commonly referred to as Section 301) provides that when a foreign
country denies rights owed to the United States under a trade agree-
ment, or when a foreign country is unfairly restricting U.S. foreign
commerce, irrespective of a breach of an international treaty, the
United States can, or even must, take retaliatory trade action against
that foreign country. 22
On its face, Section 301 does not appear to be inherently unreason-
able. However, the United States can take retaliatory action under
Section 301 even when a foreign country is fully complying with its
international obligations, since Section 301 gives the United States sole
discretion to determine what measures are unfair. Section 301 permits
action even when the foreign action in question is not a breach of an
international obligation. 23
Moreover, Section 301 can have the effect of usurping the role of
independent international dispute settlement through the GATT by
permitting U.S. retaliatory action when the GATT is breached with-
out the necessity of international approval.24 One leading authority
has described Section 301 as "aggressive unilateralism" because its
employment or threatened employment is designed to make foreign
countries yield unreciprocated trade concessions. 25 Not surprisingly,
Section 301 has attracted considerable negative international reaction
because it allows the United States to make a unilateral determination
at 11; Paul Handley, Counting the Cost, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 4, 1992, at 10; Paul Handley,
People's Wrath, FAR E. EON. REV., May 28, 1992, at 10; Rodney Tasker, Premier of Last
Resort, FAR E. ECON. REv., Apr. 16, 1992, at 10.
21. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20 (1988).
22. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1988).
23. JACKSON, supra note 3, at 106.
24. Id. at 105-06.
25. Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism: An Overview, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERAL-
ISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 1, 15, 16-28 (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990) [hereinafter AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM].
[Vol. 14:90
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of what is unfair,26 and because of the perceived damage that unilater-
alism could have on the international trading system, specifically the
GATT legal framework. 27
The recognized purpose of Section 301, which has not changed in
the years since it was originally enacted, was for the United States to
use the retaliatory authority of Section 301 vigorously as leverage on
foreign countries to eliminate unfair trade practices affecting U.S.
commerce. 28 Despite changes made to the original Section 301
through the Trade Agreements Act of 197929 and the Trade and Tariff
Act of 1984,30 deep dissatisfaction existed within Congress with the
failure of Section 301, as used by the President, to gain access for U.S.
goods and services in foreign markets where barriers allegedly ex-
isted.31 Coupled with this dissatisfaction were the United States'
growing trade deficit and the perception that while the U.S. market
was open to all, foreign markets, particularly Japan, remained rela-
tively closed to U.S. goods and services. 32 The result was significant
change to Section 301 with the enactment of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988. 33
The 1988 changes to Section 301 address several areas. They at-
tempt to circumscribe the discretion the President had to undertake
retaliatory action,34 and expand and clarify the trade practices that
will be considered unwarranted and that will lead to possible Section
26. Bhagwati writes: "It is the exercise of 301 actions.. .using the threat of trade retaliation
against other countries to accept trade practices that the United States has unilaterally decided to
consider unreasonable and hence unacceptable, that America's trading partners resent and re-
ject." Id. at 4.
27. See Elizabeth K. King, The Omnibus Trade Bill of 1988: "Super 301" and Its Effects on
the Multilateral Trade System Under the GA7, 12 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 245 (1991); Unilat-
eral Measures Under Fire, 63 Focus: GATT NEWSLETTER, at 6-8 (1989). It is argued, how-
ever, that use of Section 301 can lead to a strengthening of GATT since a flawed international
regime is ineffective and Section 301 actions can assist in correcting the flaws. See Robert E.
Hudec, Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATER-
ALISM, supra note 25, at 151-53.
28. SENATE FINANCE COMM., REPORT ON TRADE REFORM AcT OF 1974, S. REP. No.
1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7208-09. See Helen Milner, The
Political Economy of U.S. Trade Policy: A Study of the Super 301 Provision, in AGGRESSIVE
UNILATERALISM, supra note 25, at 164-66; Shirley A. Coffield, Using Section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974 as a Response to Foreign Government Trade Actions: When, Why and How, 6 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 381, 382-85 (1981).
29. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 295.
30. Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 3002.
31. See Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act: A Legislative
History of the Amendments to Section 301, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM, supra note 25, at
49, 57-59, 65-66 [hereinafter The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act]; Milner, supra note 28, at 166-67.
32. Milner, supra note 28, at 166-67. See generally Bhagwati, supra note 25, at 4-33.
33. § 1301, 102 Stat. 1107, 1164-76.
34. 19 U.S.C. §§ 241 1(a)(l)-(2) (1988). See The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act, supra note 31,
at 57-65. For a general discussion of Presidential discretion under Section 301, see Kevin C.
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301 action. 35 The new Super 301 required the USTR to identify and
initiate Section 301 actions against foreign countries that used unfair
trade practices to inhibit U.S. trade.36 Finally, Special 301 required
the United States Trade Representative (USTR), on a yearly basis, to
identify and initiate Section 301 actions against foreign countries that
deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights
to U.S. persons and products. 37
Detailed Operation
Section 301
The Section 301 process can be started by a petition from a U.S.
person or entity who claims: (i) to have been unfairly denied access to
a foreign market; (ii) that the foreign country is not abiding by an
international agreement; or (iii) that their intellectual property rights
are not being adequately protected.38 The USTR can also start the
Section 301 process on her own initiative.39 Moreover, following any
naming of priority countries under Super 301 or Special 301, the
USTR is also required to commence the Section 301 process.40 Once
the USTR agrees to commence, or is required to commence, the Sec-
tion 301 process, she must investigate and determine whether the
rights to which the United States, or any U.S. person or entity, is enti-
tled under any trade agreement are being denied. She must also deter-
mine if any act, policy, or practice exists which is "unjustifiable,"
"unreasonable," or "discriminatory," and which burdens or restricts
U.S. commerce. 41
An "unjustifiable" act, policy, or practice is one which includes the
denial of national treatment, most favored nation (MFN) treatment,
the right of establishment, the protection of intellectual property
rights, or any other action inconsistent with the international legal
Kennedy, Presidential Authority Under Section 337, Section 301, and the Escape Clause: The Case
For Less Discretion, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 127, 133-35, 142-44 (1987).
35. 19 U.S.C. §§ 241 l(d)(3)-(5) (1988). See The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act, supra note 31,
at 65-75.
36. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2420(a)-(b) (1988). See The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act, supra note 31, at
76-83.
37. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2242(a), 2412(b)(2) (1988). See The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act, supra note
31, at 85-87; Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, "Special 301" Its Requirements, Implementa-
tion and Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259, 260-65 (1989-90) [hereinafter "Special 301"
Its Requirements]. See also text accompanying notes 73-76.
38. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1988). It is up to the USTR to determine whether to accept the
petition and commence the investigation. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(2) (1988).
39. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(1)(A) (1988).
40. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2240(b), 2412(b)(2) (1988).
41. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2414(a)(1), 241 l(a)(1)(B), 241 1(b)(1) (1988).
[Vol. 14:90
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rights of the United States. 42 A "discriminatory" act, policy, or prac-
tice is one that denies national treatment or MFN treatment to U.S.
goods, services, or investment.4 3 An "unreasonable" act, policy, or
practice is one that, "while not necessarily in violation of, or inconsis-
tent with, the international legal rights of the United States, is other-
wise unfair and inequitable." 44  Included in unreasonable acts,
policies, and practices are those which deny fair and equitable market
opportunities and the provision of adequate and effective protection of
intellectual property rights;45 those which constitute export target-
ing;46 and those which constitute a denial of workers' rights and stan-
dards for minimum workers' wages, health, and safety.47
When the USTR finds that a trade agreement is being breached or
an act, policy, or practice is unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discrimina-
tory, she is to determine what action to take.48 Remedies available
include withdrawing benefits the identified foreign country enjoys pur-
suant to a trade agreement with the United States;49 entering into
agreements with the foreign country to eliminate the offending ac-
tion;50 or imposing duties or other import restrictions against any
goods or economic sector of the foreign country irrespective of the
goods or sector affected by the foreign country's offensive action.5 1
The latter situation is clearly nothing more than trade retaliation
against a foreign country.
When the USTR's investigation finds that the rights of the United
States under a trade agreement are being denied, she is not required to
take action if a panel of experts established pursuant to the GATT or
the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement52 finds to the contrary.
5 3
42. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(4) (1988).
43. 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(d)(5) (1988).
44. 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(d)(3)(A) (1988). For a discussion concerning the uncertainty regarding
the meaning of unreasonable, see David M. Pedley, A Definition for "Unreasonable" in Section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974: A Consideration of the United States - Thailand Tobacco Dispute, 5
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 285 (1991).
45. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(i) (1988). See generally The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act,
supra note 31, at 72-75.
46. 19 U.S.C. §§ 241 l(d)(3)(B), (E) (1988). See also The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act, supra
note 31, at 68-72.
47. 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(d)(3)(B)(iii) (1988). See also The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act, supra
note 31, at 65-68.
48. 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(1)(B) (1988).
49. 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(c)(1)(A) (1988).
50. 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(c)(1)(C) (1988).
51. 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(c)(1)(B), (3)(B) (1988). See also 19 U.S.C. §§ 241 1(c)(5) (1988).
52. See Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, Can.-U.S., - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -, re-
printed in 27 LL.M. 281, 383-86 (1988) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
53. 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(a)(2)(A) (1988).
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However, when the USTR finds that a foreign country's act, policy, or
practice is "unjustifiable," or the measure is determined to be inconsis-
tent with a trade agreement, she is required to withdraw trade conces-
sions, to enter into trade agreements, or to take retaliatory trade
action.54 This is the mandatory action that the Congress sought to
impose in 1988. 55 However, this mandatory action is qualified in a
number of ways. Any action to be taken by the USTR is "subject to
the specific direction, if any, of the President. ' 56 Moreover, no action
need be taken if the USTR finds that the foreign country "is taking
satisfactory measures" to grant the United States rights under a trade
agreement;57 that the foreign country has agreed to eliminate the of-
fending measure; 58 or that the retaliatory action "would cause serious
harm to the national security of the United States."'59 When the
USTR finds that the foreign country's action is "unreasonable" or
"discriminatory," she is to take all appropriate and feasible action to
obtain the elimination of the offending act, policy, or practice, but no
mandatory action is called for.6°
The above process has existed, with some modification, since 1974.
Despite the potentially powerful nature of Section 301, it was infre-
quently employed until 1985.61 Commencing in 1985, the Reagan Ad-
ministration vigorously applied Section 301 primarily to forestall
congressional change to the provision.62 Between 1985 and 1989,
trade retaliation pursuant to Section 301 was employed in nine cases.63
In a further four cases, trade retaliation was avoided at the last mo-
ment when negotiating progress justified delay. It should be noted
that Section 301 was designed to be used for negotiating leverage. The
threat of Section 301 is often enough to effect the desired behavior.
Hence, its relatively infrequent use is not indicative of its power as a
bargaining chip.
Super 301
In 1988, Congress added to Section 301 the processes known as
54. 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(a)(1), (c)(1) (1988).
55. See The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act, supra note 31, at 57-65.
56. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1) (1988).
57. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2)(B)(i) (1988).
58. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1988).
59. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2)(B)(v) (1988).
60. 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(b) (1988).
61. Only 18 petitions were filed between 1975 and 1979. This number jumped to 35 between
1980 and 1985. Milner, supra note 28, at 166.
62. See The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act, supra note 31, at 60.
63. Hudec, supra note 27, at 121-22, 153-56.
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Super 30164 and Special 301.65 Under Super 301, as part of her annual
report to Congress in 1989 and 1990, the USTR was to identify "prior-
ity" practices "the elimination of which [were] likely to have the most
significant potential to increase United States exports,"'6 6 and "prior-
ity" countries, which had in place significant barriers to U.S. exports
of goods or services and foreign direct investment.67 When a priority
country was identified in the annual report (and it appeared that the
USTR had a significant discretion in identifying such a priority coun-
try) the USTR was to initiate a Section 301 investigation of the trade
measure identified as a priority practice.6 8 The USTR was required to
attempt to negotiate an agreement with the named priority country to
eliminate the offending practice,69 and if such an agreement was
reached before the completion of the Section 301 process, the process
was to be suspended. 70 The Super 301 process did not require the
United States to take retaliatory trade action against a named priority
country.
In 1989, the first year of Super 301, Japan, Brazil, and India were
named as priority countries.71 Japan and Brazil were able to satisfy
the USTR and were removed from the priority list. However, the
1990 priority list continued to include India and its insurance and in-
vestment practices.72
Special 301
Like Super 301, Special 301 requires the USTR to identify, on a
yearly basis, priority countries. The difference is Special 301 is aimed
at countries which "have the most onerous or egregious" policies that
deny adequate and effective intellectual property rights or deny fair
market access to U.S. persons which rely upon intellectual property
protection. 73 The USTR is to initiate an investigation under the Sec-
64. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1302, 102 Stat.
1107, 1176-79 (codified as 19 U.S.C. § 2420 (1988)).
65. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1303, 102 Stat.
1107, 1179-81 (codified as 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (1988)).
66. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2420(a)(1)(A), (a)(3) (1988).
67. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2420(a)(1)(B), (a)(2), 2241(a)(1)(A) (1988).
68. 19 U.S.C. § 2420(b) (1988). The USTR was to initiate a Section 301 investigation pursu-
ant to 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2) (1988). See supra note 40.
69. 19 U.S.C. § 2420(c)(1) (1988).
70. 19 U.S.C. § 2420(c)(2) (1988).
71. OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, USTR FACT SHEET: "SUPER 301" TRADE
LIBERALIZATION PRIORITIES (1989), reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 715-18 (May 31,
1989).
72. Identification of Trade Liberalization Priorities Pursuant to Section 310 of the Trade Act
of 1974, as Amended, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,693, 18,695 (U.S. Trade Rep. 1991).
73. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2242(a), (b)Cl)(A) (1988).
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tion 301 process respecting any foreign country named as a priority
country.7
4
The Special 301 process requires the USTR to monitor all foreign
intellectual property laws and practices and report on them yearly. In
the first year of Special 301, the USTR declined to name any priority
countries, although the USTR created a "priority watch list" and a
"watch list" naming countries that were, according to the USTR, lax
in the protection of intellectual property rights.75 India, Thailand, and
the People's Republic of China (PRC) were designated as priority
countries in 1991.76
THE CIGARETTE CASE
Using Section 301
In April 1989, as part of a well-organized campaign to increase
tobacco exports, 77 the U.S. Cigarette Exporters Association (CEA)
filed a Section 301 petition with the USTR against Thailand and the
Thailand Tobacco Monopoly. 78  On the basis of the petition, the
USTR initiated an investigation of the Thai practices which allegedly
discriminated against U.S. cigarettes and were unfair barriers to
trade.79 The principal complaint was that Thai law, in particular the
1966 Tobacco Act, prohibited the importation of tobacco except under
an import license; only on three occasions had import licenses been
granted. 80 The CEA also complained that Thai taxes were not applied
fairly, that U.S. companies should be allowed to advertise despite the
74. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2) (1988). See supra note 40.
75. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 71. See also Brian M.
Berliner, Making Intellectual Property Pirates Walk the Plank Using "Special 301" to Protect the
United States' Rights, 12 Loy. L.A. INT'L CoMP. L.J. 725, 737-38 (1990); "Special 301": Its
Requirements, supra note 37, at 267; Unfair Trade Practices: USTR Defends Administration's
Naming of Japan, India and Brazil Under Super 301, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 684 (May 31,
1989); Super 301 Threats, IP AsIA, July 6, 1989, at 12.
76. Notice of Countries Identified as Priority Foreign Countries, 56 Fed. Reg. 20,060 (U.S.
Trade Rep. 1991). See Intellectual Property: USTR Designates China, India, and Thailand Most
Egregious Violators Under Special 301, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 643 (May 31, 1991); USTR
Names India, Thailand and PRC As Priority Foreign Countries, IP ASIA, May 30, 1991, at 10.
77. See Fred H. Jones, U.S. Tobacco Goes Abroad: Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act as a
Tool for Achieving Access to Foreign Tobacco Markets, 14 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 439
(1989); Pedley, supra note 44, at 299-302.
78. Petition filed under 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1988). See Pedley, supra note 44, at 299 n.59;
Suthiphon Thaveechaiyagarn, Current Developments: The Section 301 Cigarette Case Against
Thailand - A Thai Perspective, 21 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 367, at 368 n.7 (1990).
79. Initiation of Section 302 Investigation; Thailand's Restrictions on Access to Its Cigarette
Market, 54 Fed. Reg. 23,724 (U.S. Trade Rep. 1989).
80. Id. See also Thai-U.S. GATT Panel, supra note 4, at 201; Thaveechaiyagarn, supra note
78, at 369; Pedley, supra note 44, at 299.
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advertising ban put in place in January 1989,81 and that U.S. exports
should not have to go through the Thai government or the existing
Thailand Tobacco Monopoly.8 2 Significant opposition to the potential
U.S. retaliatory action existed in Thailand from the Thai tobacco in-
dustry, labor unions, and health authorities.8 3 Opposition also existed
in the United States, where some perceived the CEA as trying to force
smoking upon Third World countries at a time when the anti-smoking
campaign was having success in the United States.84 Former U.S. Sur-
geon-General C. Everett Koop called the efforts of the CEA "the
height of hypocrisy."8 5
Direct negotiations between the two countries, as required under
section 301,86 made little headway.8 7 Because it was clear that some of
the allegations against Thailand involved potential violations of the
GATT, and because the negotiations were unproductive, the USTR
was required to proceed under the GATT dispute settlement process.88
The decision of the USTR to utilize the GATT was seen, however, as
a victory for the anti-smoking groups in the United States and Thai-
land since it supposedly moved the dispute from a U.S.-controlled pro-
cess to one that was more objective.89
Consultations, as required under GATT Article XXIII(l), be-
tween Thailand and the United States were unsuccessful and the
United States requested a dispute settlement panel. 90 Thailand ac-
ceded to the request and in the spring of 1990 a panel was established
to examine the GATT consistency of Thailand's import restrictions
and internal taxes on cigarettes.91
While the GATT process proceeded, the United States continued
to pressure Thailand and threatened retaliatory measures under Sec-
tion 301 by indicating which products might be hit by a retaliatory
import embargo. 92 Thailand's response was to await the report of the
81. See Thai-U.S. GATT Panel, supra note 4, at 201. See also Pedley, supra note 44, at 299;
Thaveechaiyagarn, supra note 78, at 374-75.
82. Thaveechaiyagarn, supra note 78, at 374-75.
83. See id. at 372.
84. Id. at 370-71.
85. Id. at 371.
86. 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(1) (1988).
87. Thaveechaiyagarn, supra note 78, at 370.
88. 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2) (1988).
89. See Thaveechaiyagarn, supra note 78, at 380-81.
90. ThaiL-U.S. GATT Panel, supra note 4, at 200.
91. Id.
92. Thailand To Lodge Protest With GAIT Over U.S. Retaliation, BANGKOK POST WKLY.
REV., Sept. 28, 1990, at 11 [hereinafter Thailand To Lodge Protest]. Similar tactics had been
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GATT panel before entering into serious negotiations93 and to indicate
that if the United States proceeded unilaterally that Thailand would
complain to the GATT.94
The GA IT Panel Report
The two issues with which the panel had to deal were the GATT
consistency of: (i) Thailand's application of its excise, business and
municipal tax; and (ii) Thailand's restriction on the import of tobacco
products. 95
On the excise tax issue, the 1966 Thai Tobacco Act established
that the ceiling rate of excise tax for domestic cigarettes was sixty per-
cent of the retail price and for imported cigarettes the ceiling rate was
eighty percent of the retail price.96 The United States argued that the
possibility of a higher tax being placed on imported cigarettes than on
domestic cigarettes was inconsistent with the GATT obligation of na-
tional treatment under Article III(1) and (2).97 In July 1990, while the
GATT process was underway, the Thai Ministry of Finance issued a
regulation that set the excise rate for all cigarettes, regardless of origin,
at fifty-five percent ad valorem.98 The GATT panel held, consistent
with previous decisions,99 that the legislative possibility of a higher
excise tax rate on foreign cigarettes would not, by itself, constitute a
violation of the national treatment provision.t °°
Concerning business and municipal taxes, the Tobacco Act had
exempted domestic tobacco products from the taxes'01 and the United
States argued that this also amounted to a breach of the national treat-
ment obligation.10 2 Again while the GATT process was in motion, the
Thai government, through a Royal Decree, explicitly exempted all im-
utilized by the United States in its tobacco dispute with Japan. See Thaveechaiyagarn, supra note
78, at 382.
93. Thailand To Lodge Protest, supra note 92, at 11.
94. Thailand To Lodge Protest, supra note 92, at 11. It is highly probable that U.S. retalia-
tion under Section 301 would be GATT-inconsistent. See Bhagwati, supra note 25, at 34-35, 38;
Hudec, supra note 27, at 118-25; King, supra note 27, at 262-68.
95. ThaiL.-US. GATT Panel, supra note 4, at 201-03.
96. Id. at 202.
97. Id. at 202-03, 214-15.
98. Id. at 202, 214.
99. European Economic Community: Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components,
GATT Doec. L/6657 (May 16, 1990), reprinted in BISD, supra note 3, at 132 (37th supp. 1991);
United States: Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, GATT Doec. L/6175 (June
17, 1987), reprinted in BISD, supra note 3, at 136 (34th supp. 1988).
100. Thail.-US. GATT Panel, supra note 4, at 227.
101. Id. at 202.
102. Id. at 202-03, 215.
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ported cigarettes from payment of the business and municipal taxes. 103
The GATT panel took the view that the action by the Thai govern-
ment removed any discrimination, and the mere fact that the Tobacco
Act continued to enable the government to levy discriminatory taxes
was not sufficient to constitute a breach of national treatment.'0 4
On the import restriction issue, cigarettes could not be imported
into Thailand except under an import license. On only three occasions
in 25 years had an import license been issued.105 It was largely uncon-
tested by Thailand that its law and practice regarding import licensing
for cigarettes were inconsistent with GATT Article XI(1), which ex-
plicitly prohibits the use of licensing to restrict imports.10 6 Thailand's
principal arguments were that the inconsistency with GATT Article
XI(l) was justified by: (i) GATT Article XI(2)(c), which permits im-
port restrictions to enforce domestic marketing or product restrictions
for agricultural products; 1 7 (ii) Thailand's 1982 Protocol of Acces-
sion to the GATT, 08 which grandfathered legislation of a mandatory
nature inconsistent with the GATr;10 9 and (iii) GATT Article
XX(b), which allows derogation from GATT rules when the measures
are necessary to protect human life or health. 110
The GATT panel rejected all three of the justifications put forward
by Thailand for the import restrictions on cigarettes. Respecting Arti-
cle XI(2)(c), the panel, relying on previous panel findings and the
drafting history of the provision, determined that the marketing excep-
tion only applied to fresh produce and not to products to which fur-
ther processing was intended.I 1 Cigarettes were neither fresh produce
nor products to which further processing was intended. 112 The
grandfathering argument under the Protocol of Accession was dis-
missed because only legislation of a "mandatory character" 13 was to
103. Id. at 202.
104. Id. at 227.
105. Ii at 201.
106. Id. at 204, 221.
107. Id. at 203.
108. Accession of Thailand, GAIT Doc. L/5404 (Oct. 21 1982), GATF Doc. L/5314 (July
21, 1982), reprinted in BISD, supra note 3, at 7, 29 (29th supp. 1983). Thailand became a mem-
ber of GATr through the Protocol of Accession.
109. ThaiL-US. GATPanel, supra note 4, at 203, 212-13.
110. Id. at 203, 206.
111. Id. at 222. The previous panel report was Japan: Restrictions on the Import of Certain
Agricultural Products, GATT Doc. L/6253 (Mar. 22, 1988), reprinted in BISD, supra note 3, at
163 (35th supp. 1989).
112. Id.
113. See Norway: Restrictions on Imports of Apples and Pears, GATT Doc. L/6474 (June 22,
1989), reprinted in BISD, supra note 3, at 306, 319-20 (36th supp. 1990).
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be included; the Tobacco Act did not impose a requirement to restrict
imports, rather the legislation explicitly allowed for the issuing of im-
port licenses.'1 4 The GATT panel accepted that smoking constituted
a serious risk to human health and that measures designed to reduce
cigarette consumption fell within Article XX(b), the health excep-
tion. 115 The panel noted, however, that Article XX(b) required that a
measure, in order to fit the exception, be necessary to protect human
life or health."16 The panel concluded that "Thailand's practice of
permitting the sale of domestic cigarettes while not permitting the im-
portation of foreign cigarettes was an inconsistency with the General
Agreement not 'necessary' within the meaning of Article XX(b)." 7
The panel report was adopted by the GATT Council in November
1990, with Thailand deciding not to delay or veto adoption of the re-
port. 18 In fact, in October 1990, the Thai Cabinet announced that it
would be lifting the import ban on cigarettes." 9
Post-GA TT Panel Discussions
Thai-U.S. negotiators met following the release of the GATT panel
report to discuss its implementation and other issues raised in the Sec-
tion 301 investigation. The United States continued to threaten retali-
atory action under Section 301 regarding issues of cigarette
distribution, advertising, 120 and tariffs. 121 The GATT panel did not
deal with these issues directly. However, at one point the panel noted
that a ban on advertising of all cigarettes, both of domestic and foreign
origins, would be consistent with the GATT.12 2 The panel further
noted that nothing in the GATT prohibited the use of government
monopolies, such as the Thai Tobacco Monopoly, so long as no
favorable treatment was provided. 23 As long as the thirty percent
Thai tariff on imported cigarettes applied to all imports, there was lit-
114. Thail-U.S. GATT Panel, supra note 4, at 226-27.
115. Id. at 222-23.
116. Id. The question of this criterion of "necessary" was elaborated upon at 223.
117. Id. at 226.
118. US/Thailand: Thai Restrictions on Importation ofand Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, 76
Focus: GATT NEWSLETrER 7 (1990).
119. U.S. Reacts Positively After Favourable GA TT Ruling, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV.,
Oct. 19, 1990, at 11.
120. Pressure From U.S. Sparks New Cigarette Row, BANGKOK POsr WKLY. REV., Oct. 26,
1990, at 16.
121. Gov't Grants U.S. Free Hand on Cigarette Distribution, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV.,
Nov. 2, 1990, at 11.
122. Thail.-U.S. GATT Panel, supra note 4, at 224-25.
123. Id. at 225.
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tle argument the United States could make under the GATT.124
In November 1990, the USTR terminated its Section 301 case
against Thailand, being satisfied that Thailand was implementing the
GATT panel decision. 125 Moreover, an arrangement for the establish-
ment of private distributorships was concluded. 126 Thailand made no
concessions respecting the ban on cigarette advertising or the thirty
percent tariff.127 It is interesting to note that when U.S. cigarettes be-
gan entering Thailand in 1991, there were complaints from the Thai
Tobacco Monopoly that the U.S. cigarettes were being dumped at
prices below cost. No investigation of the alleged dumping has yet
been initiated. 128
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Thailand's Intellectual Property Laws
In 1931, Thailand became a party to the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works1 29 and took that opportu-
nity to evaluate its position regarding trademark, copyrights, and pat-
ent law. New copyright legislation was put in place, replacing the old
copyright legislation. 130 A new trademark law was enacted131 and the
first draft of a patent law was considered.1 32
The 1931 Trademark Act was based on English trademark legisla-
tion and subsequent interpretation and construction of the Thai Act
has generally followed English law.133 Thailand, unlike the United
States, is not a member of the 1883 Paris Convention on Industrial
124. If the tariff applied to all incoming cigarettes, the tariff would be consistent with the
most favored nation principle. Thailand's position on the tariff was to let the United States com-
plain to GATT if it was unhappy. U.S. To End Cigarette Action Against Thailand, BANGKOK
POST WKLY. REv., Nov. 30, 1990, at 16.
125. Id.
126. Gov't Grants U.S. Free Hand on Cigarette Distribution, supra note 121, at 11.
127. U.S. To End Cigarette Action Against Thailand, supra note 124, at 16.
128. Tobacco Board Urges Probe Into Cheap Foreign Cigarettes, BANGKOK POST WKLY.
REv., Oct. 18, 1991, at 15.
129. The Berne Convention of 1886 for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, as
revised July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. Thailand's reservations to its acceptance of the Berne
Convention are noted in PIRAWAT SUKONTHAPAN, COPYRIGHT LAWS OF THE ASEAN COUN-
TRIES: PROTECTION OF FOREIGN WORKS 71-72 n.49 (1985).
130. Act for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, B.E. 2474 (1931) (Thail.). Copy-
right legislation was first enacted in Thailand in 1902 and updated in 1914. Chaiyos Hemarajata,
Introduction to Thai Law: Laws on Copyright Protection, 2 CHULALONGKORN L. REv. 77 (1983).
131. Trademark Act, B.E. 2474 (1931) (Thail.).
132. Anek Srisanit, The Patent Law of Thailand, in THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THAILAND 89
(1991).
133. Sanguan Lewmanonont, Trademark Law & Practice, in THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THAI-
LAND 96 (1981).
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Property, which deals with trademarks.1 34 The 1931 Trademark Act
was revised in 1961, but remained as the principal piece of trademark
legislation for sixty years.13 5 In late 1991, a new trademark law passed
through the Thai National Legislative Assembly. The legislation came
into force in February 1992.136 The 1931 Copyright Law, enacted to
implement the Berne Convention to which the United States was not a
party, was revised and updated through the Copyright Act of 1978.137
Despite having first drafted a patent law in 1931, it was not until
1979 that Thailand finally enacted a patent law. 38 The Thai patent
law is based on the model proposed by the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), 139 an organization to which Thailand only be-
came a member in September 1990.140
134. Paris Convention of 1883 for Protection of Industrial Property, as revised, July 14,
1967, 21 U.S.T.S. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
The main advantage of the Paris Convention remains essentially that it enables foreign na-
tionals by the rule of national treatment and the right of priority to obtain and claim protec-
tion of their industrial property rights in other countries....
Hans P. Kunz-Hallstein, The United States Proposal for a GA 7TAgreement on Intellectual Prop-
erty and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 265, 268 (1989).
The effect of non-membership, therefore, is that Thailand is not obliged to offer the same
trademark protection to foreigners as it does to its own citizens. See Lewmanonont, supra note
133, at 96; SEuI NAYA ET AL., ASEAN-U.S. INITIATIVE: ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS FOR IMPROVED ECONOMIC RELATIONS 83-84, 90 (1989).
135. Concerning Thailand's trademark legislation, see Lewmanonont, supra note 133, at 96-
102; Srisanit Anek, Legal Aspects of Trade and Investment in Thailand, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND INVESTMENT IN THE FAR EAST 141, 178-83 (Dennis Campbell
& Arthur Wolff eds., 1989); Gregory J. Koebel, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Sin-
gapore and Thailand: A Comparative Analysis, 13 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 309, 313-15 (1987); Into B.
Champon, Comment, The Next "Little Tiger": Manufacturing and Intellectual Property Rights in
Thailand, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 275, 321-23 (1990); Thomas O'Neill III, Comment, Intellectual
Property Protection in Thailand: Asia's Young Tiger and America's "Growing" Concern, 11 U. PA.
J. INT'L Bus. L. 603, 610 (1990).
136. Suchint Chaimungkaanont, Trademark Licence Agreements Under The Trademark Act
of 1991, IP ASIA, Jan. 23, 1992, at 24; Assembly Passes Trademark Bill, BANGKOK POST WKLY.
REV., Sept. 20, 1991, at 14. The contents of the new legislation are discussed in Trademark Bill
Clears First Hurdle, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., June 21, 1991, at 4; Ratanawadee
Ruangmalai, New Trademark Law Proposed - Service Marks, IP ASIA, Aug. 15, 1991, at 18;
Dhajjai Subhapolsiri, New Rules For Trademark Licensing, IP ASIA, Apr. 25, 1991, at 20-22.
137. Copyright Act, B.E. 2521 (1978) (Ihail.). See Hemarajata, supra note 130, at 88; Anek,
supra note 135, at 183-86. Concerning the issue of protection of foreign copyright, see
SUKONTHAPAN, supra note 129, at 71-79; Champon, supra note 135, at 323-25.
138. Patents Act, B.E. 2522 (1979) (Thail.). Srisanit, supra note 132, at 89.
139. NAYA, supra note 134, at 89. Concerning Thai patent law, see Anek, supra note 135, at
174-178; Champon, supra note 135, at 315-21; Srisanit, supra note 132, at 89-95. See also Con-
vention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T.
1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3. WIPO was organized in 1963 to oversee the major international agree-
ments on intellectual property, including both the Berne and Paris Conventions. WIPO also has
as an objective the promotion of intellectual property rights protection through technical assist-
ance and educational support. See R. Michael Gadbaw, Intellectual Property and International
Trade: Merger or Marriage of Convenience, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 223 (1989).
140. Rebecca Rungsang, Thailand Accedes to WIPO Convention, IP ASIA, Feb. 8, 1990, at
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U.S. Strategy
In the last decade the United States has been aggressively pursuing
the international protection of intellectual property rights owned by
U.S. citizens.141 The U.S. policy has been one of simultaneously mov-
ing multilaterally and bilaterally to achieve greater protection.1 42
Multilaterally, the United States is pushing at the current Uruguay
Round of Negotiations to have as part of the GATT an international
regime for the protection of intellectual property rights. 143 Changes
made in U.S. law in 1984144 and 1988 have increased the weapons the
United States can employ against countries that it feels are not ade-
quately protecting U.S. intellectual property rights.
In bilateral relations, the U.S. strategy has been one of trying to
persuade targeted countries to alter their intellectual property laws
through education, training seminars, and persuasion.145 When this is
unsuccessful, the U.S. strategy has been to employ economic coercion
through the threatened revocation of benefits under the Generalized
141. The value of sales lost in 1986 due to unauthorized copying of U.S. patented, copy-
righted, and trademarked material is estimated to be in excess of $40 billion. Theodore H. Davis,
Jr., Combatting Piracy of Intellectual Property in International Markets: A Proposed Modification
of the Special 301 Act, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 505, 508 n.8 (1991).
The U.S. aggressiveness is further fueled by the perceived need for protection rights on tech-
nology to enhance or maintain U.S. competitiveness. This aggressiveness and resort to trade law
is elaborated upon by Gadbaw, supra note 139, at 226-35.
142. The interaction between the multilateral and bilateral approach is succinctly com-
mented upon by Robert W. Kastenmeier & David Beier, International Trade and Intellectual
Property: Promise, RiskA and Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285, 288-90 (1989). The
thrust of their comments is that the bilateral approach of "threat/negotiation" would not be
useful on some U.S. trading partners and therefore the use of GATT was necessary. Moreover,
the use of GATT might energize the existing intellectual property fora such as WIPO. See also
Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multi-
lateralism, 76 IOWA L. REv. 273, 292-97 (1991).
143. See generally Thomas Cottier, The Prospects for Intellectual Property in GA 7T, 28 Com-
MON MKT. L. REV. 383 (1991) (discussing GAT's suitability as an intellectual property en-
forcement mechanism); Frank Emmert, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round - Negotiating
Strategies of the Western Industrialized Countries, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1317 (1990); David Har-
tridge & Arvind Subramanian, Intellectual Property Rights: The Issues in GA7T, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 893 (1989); Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 134; Eric Wolfhard, International Trade
in Intellectual Property: The Emerging GATT Regime, 49 U. TORONTO FAc. LAW REv. 106
(1991).
144. Section 301 was amended in 1984 to include inadequate intellectual property protection
within the scope of unjustifiable and unreasonable trade practices. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 104A(c), 98 Stat. 2948, 3007.
Another change made in 1984 was to include intellectual property protection as a criterion in
the determination of a country's eligibility for status as a beneficiary developing country for the
pdrposes of the U.S. generalized system of preferences (GSP). See generally Paul H. Adams,
Suspension of Generalized System of Preferences from Chile - The Proper Use of a Trade Provi-
sion?, 23 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 501, 501-14 (1989); Ronald I. Meltzer, The U.S.
Renewal of the GSP: Implications for North-South Trade, 20 J. WORLD TRADE & L. 507, 507-20
(1986); O'Neill, supra note 135, at 613-14.
145. SATHIRATHAI, supra note 1, at 23; O'Neill, supra note 135, at 612-13.
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System of Preferences (GSP) program 146 and employment of Section
301 trade retaliation.1 47 It has even been suggested that part of the
U.S. strategy is the vetoing of International Monetary Fund and
World Bank loans to targeted countries. 148
Until relatively recently, Thailand had not been singled out for at-
tention by the United States. Numerous other Asian and non-Asian
countries have been subject to bilateral pressure from the United
States on intellectual property issues. 149 However, in the last few
years, U.S. pressure on Thailand has been slowly escalating. In Janu-
ary 1989, U.S. unhappiness with the slow progress of talks with Thai-
land and the alleged failure of Thailand to protect U.S. intellectual
property rights adequately led the U.S. government to significantly re-
duce the coverage provided by the GSP to Thai products entering the
United States. 150 Continuing U.S. unhappiness respecting patent and
copyright protection resulted in two Section 301 investigations being
commenced by the USTR in early 1991.151 Finally, as previously
noted, Thailand was named as a priority country under Special 301 in
May 1991.152
Using Section 301
U.S. pressure on Thailand has resulted in some change. A new
Trademark Act has been enacted which updates its 1931 predecessor
and which has broader coverage and more significant penalties for in-
fringement of trademark rights. 53 U.S. complaints about Thailand's
146. O'Neill, supra note 135, at 613-14.
147. Id.; SATHIRATHAI, supra note 1, at 23.
148. SATHIRATHAI, supra note 1, at 23; Surakiart Sathirathai, The International Movement
on Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and GAT An Analysis of Thailand's Position, 29
MALAYA L. REv. 329, 332 (1987).
149. The countries have included Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malay-
sia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Taiwan. See generally "Special 301" Its Require-
ments, supra note 37, at 265-72; Berliner, supra note 75, at 735-39.
150. See O'Neill, supra note 135, at 605, 613-14, 616; Thailand Gains Little From U.S. Duty
Exgmption-Bank Report, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Nov. 9, 1990, at 18-19; GSP President
Reagan Denies Thailand Larger GSP Benefits, Citing Intellectual Property Record, 6 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 96 (Jan. 25, 1989).
151. Initiation of Section 302 Investigation; Thailand Copyright Enforcement, 56 Fed. Reg.
292 (U.S. Trade Rep. 1991); Initiation of Section 302 Investigation and Request for Public Com-
ment; Thailand Patent Protection, 56 Fed. Reg. 11,815 (U.S. Trade Rep. 1991).
152. Notice of Countries Identified as Priority Foreign Countries, 56 Fed. Reg. 20,060 (U.S.
Trade Rep. 1991).
153. Trademark Bill Clears First Hurdle, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., June 21, 1991, at 4.
U.S. complaints are noted in O'Neill, supra note 135, at 608-11. It appears that the United States
is satisfied with the new Thai legislation. USTR: Piracy Talks Will Make Headway, BANGKOK
POST WKLY. REV., Oct. 4, 1991, at 6. Concerning the details of the new legislation, see supra
note 136.
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Copyright Law had been that the law did not protect works under
copyright in the United States. Since the United States was not a
party to the Berne Convention, Thailand's legislation did not provide
for reciprocal rights and Thai courts had not interpreted the relevant
Thai-U.S. friendship treaty as granting reciprocal rights to U.S. copy-
righted material.15 4 U.S. accession to the Berne Convention on Janu-
ary 1, 1989155 has removed much of the cause of the dispute. 156
However, the difficult issue of copyright protection for computer
software remains unsolved. The Thai Copyright Act is silent on this
question.15 7 While the United States argues strongly that the copy-
right law should be amended to cover computer software, 158 the Thais
respond that it would be more appropriate to await a court decision on
the matter 59 and that the best judicial opinion seems to be that com-
puter software would be included in the Copyright Act.160 Despite its
initial insistence, the United States has apparently agreed with Thai-
land's approach to this issue,161 perhaps assured by the willingness of
the Thai government to explicitly provide copyright protection for
computer software when the Copyright Act is amended.1 62
Copyright Enforcement
In November 1990, after years of complaining, a coalition of U.S.
copyright industries filed a petition under Section 301 alleging that
Thailand's failure to enforce its copyright law against manufacturers
154. The details of the dispute are discussed in SATimATHAi, supra note 1, at 24-26;
O'Neill, supra note 135, at 610-11.
155. U.S. Joins Berne Convention, IP ASIA, Nov. 25, 1988, at 15. See also Richard J. Inglis,
Comment, The United States Legislates Its Way Into Berne, 13 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L. L.J. 282
(1989).
156. The issue of retroactive protection has apparently been worked out. 1991 NAT'L TRADE
ESTIMATEs, supra note 10, at 216; Thailand Copyright, IP ASIA, Apr. 19, 1990, at 20.
157. SATHiRATHAI, supra note 1, at 27; Champon, supra note 135, at 323; O'Neill, supra
note 135, at 618.
158. O'Neill, supra note 135, at 619.
159. SATHIRATHAI, supra note 1, at 25.
160. See id. at 27. See also U.S. Pressure Beginning To Show Results, IP ASIA, Oct. 18, 1990,
at 9-10.
161. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTAIVE, 1990 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATES REPORT ON FOR-
EIGN TRADE BARRIERS 194 (1990); Thailand - Computer Software and Trademark Protection,
IP ASIA, May 24, 1990, at 26. It is reported that the Business Software Alliance (BSA) is com-
mencing legal action against 80 companies in Thailand regarding selling of pirated software.
Enforcement News Thailand, IP ASIA, May 30, 1991, at 38. See also BSA Goes On The Offensive,
IP ASIA, Jan. 4, 1990, at 37-39.
162. 1991 NAT'L TRADE ESTIMATES, supra note 10, at 216. A subcommittee has been
formed to examine including software within the Copyright Act. Thailand-Computer Software
and Trademark Protection, IP ASIA, May 24, 1990, at 26. However, there has been opposition
within Thailand to software being protected. U.S. Pressure Beginning To Show Results, supra
note 160, at 9-10.
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of pirated audio and video cassettes was resulting in annual losses of
between $70 and $100 million.163 The thrust of the petition was that
the Thai Copyright Act was acceptable, but enforcement was lacking.
It has been reported that between 1986 and 1990, Thai authorities had
obtained 1,000 convictions for criminal infringement of the Copyright
Act, although in these cases the fines were small and no jail time was
served. 164 Despite this, spokespersons for the U.S. coalition claimed
that Thailand had stopped enforcing its copyright laws when foreign
rights were involved and that personal threats had been made against
those trying to enforce the laws. 165 They also argued that the proce-
dures for obtaining search warrants and convictions were cumbersome
and did not operate efficiently.166 In late 1990, the USTR announced
they had accepted the petition and had opened a formal investiga-
tion. 167 At that time Deputy USTR Julius L. Katz was quoted as say-
ing: "There appears to be a persistent failure on the part of the
authorities of Thailand to enforce its own laws with respect to copy-
rights."168 Since the commencement of the USTR investigation, there
has been "an aggressive campaign" enforcing copyright laws against
music and video pirates.169 The affected Thai businesses complained
that the crackdown was too aggressive and that the government
should resist U.S. pressure. 170
Negotiation between the enforcement arm of the foreign tape pro-
ducers operating in Thailand and several of the prominent Thai copi-
ers has resulted in an agreement to cease copying in exchange for
163. Initiation of Section 302 Investigation; Thailand Copyright Enforcement, 56 Fed. Reg.
292 (U.S. Trade Rep. 1991). See also U.S Copyright Industry Coalition Files Unfair Trade Com-
plaint Against Thailand, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1768 (Nov. 21, 1990).
164. USTR Initiates Section 301 Investigation, IP ASIA, Jan. 10, 1991, at 38-40.
165. See US. Copyright Coalition Announces Intention to File Section 301 Complaint Against
Thailand, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1645 (Oct. 31, 1990); Senators, Copyright Industries Criticize
Thailand's Alleged Failure to Stop Piracy, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 854 (June 13, 1990); Intellec-
tual Property: Hills, Citing Significant Progress, Declines to Name Countries Under Special 301
Provision, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 616 (May 2, 1990).
166. These procedures are described in USTR Initiates Section 301 Investigation, IP AIA,
Jan. 10, 1991, at 38-40. See also Rebecca Rungsang, IIPA Lobbies For Trade Sanctions, IP AsIA,
Feb. 8, 1990, at 15-17.
167. Initiation of Section 302 Investigation; Thailand Copyright Enforcement, 56 Fed. Reg.
292 (U.S. Trade Rep. 1991). See also U.S. Launches Investigation of Thailand's Weak Enforce-
ment of Copyright Legislation, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 4 (Jan. 2, 1991).
168. US. Launches Investigation of Thailand's Weak Enforcement of Copyright Legislation,
supra note 167.
169. See Raid On Pirates Signals Crackdown, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., July 26, 1991, at
14; Audio and Video Pirates Don't Want To Face the Music, IP AsIA, July 4, 1991, at 44; Ratch-
apol Laovanitch Tape Producers Protest Crackdown, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., May 24,
1991, at 13; Crackdown Launched On Property Rights Pirates, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV.,
Apr. 12, 1991, at 11.
170. Tape Producers Protest Crackdown, supra note 169, at 13.
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dropping the existing charges and a grace period. 171 In late 1991, the
USTR announced that it was ending its Section 301 investigation of
Thai enforcement of copyrights, although it was going to continue to
monitor Thai enforcement practices. 172 USTR Carla Hills indicated
that while Thailand's copyright enforcement was inadequate, she be-
lieved that Thailand was willing to reform its practices and was satis-
fied that Thailand would take the necessary steps to protect U.S.
copyright holders.1 73 The U.S. announcement followed a series of
meetings from which it had been reported that the United States was
"satisfied" with the progress being made on enforcement issues.1 74
Perhaps more significantly, the termination of the Section 301 investi-
gation came at the end of a brief visit to the United States by Thai
Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun.1 75 The coalition of U.S. indus-
tries that originally filed the Section 301 petition indicated that they
were disappointed with the USTR decision and that they felt the Thai
government had yet to take effective action to eliminate the alleged
piracy. 176
Patent Law and Pharmaceuticals
In early 1991, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
(PMA) filed a petition under Section 301177 to examine the patent law
of Thailand as it related to pharmaceuticals. The USTR agreed to
171. Top Thai Tape Pirates Agree To End Practice, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REv., Dec. 13,
1991, at 14. This agreement followed an extensive period of negotiation. See Audio And Video
Pirates Don't Want To Face The Music, supra note 169, at 44; Raid On Pirates Signals Crack-
down, supra note 169, at 14; Tape Producers Protest Crackdown, supra note 169, at 13.
172. USTR's 301 Copyright Investigation Against Thailand Over Hills Says, 9 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 15 (Jan. 1, 1992); Pornpimol Kanchanalak, USTR Halts Probe Into Copyright Viola-
tions, BANGKOK PosT WKLY. REv., Dec. 27, 1991; Nayan Chanda, U.S. Ends Probe of Thai
Enforcement of Copyrights, But Continues Monitoring, AsIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL
(Weekly), Dec. 23, 1991, at 5.
173. USTR's 301 Copyright Investigation Against Thailand Over, Hills Says, supra note 172.
174. USTR: Piracy Talks Will Make Headway, BANGKOK PosT WKLY. REv., Oct. 4, 1991,
at 6; Cabinet Likely to Decide on Key Drug Patent Issue, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REv., Sept. 27,
1991, at 13; Minister Predicts Troubles Ahead in Patent Issue Talks, BANGKOK POST WKLY.
REv., July 26, 1991, at 14.
175. USTR Halts Probe Into Copyright Violations, supra note 172, at 1; US. Ends Probe of
Thai Enforcement of Copyrights, but Continues Monitoring, supra note 172, at 5. See also
Pornpimol Kanchanalak, Bush, Anand to Discuss Probe on Copyright Issue, BANGKOK POsT
WKLY. Rnv., Dec. 20, 1991, at 20.
176. USTR's 301 Copyright Investigation Against Thailand Over, Hills Says, supra note 172.
177. Section 301 Complaint Filed Over Drug Patent Protection, IP AsIA, Mar. 21, 1991, at 24;
Pharmaceutical Industry Files Petition Against Thailand Over Patent Protection, 8 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 200 (Feb. 6, 1991). This petition is part of a worldwide strategy used by drug
companies to increase patent protection and combat generic drugs. See Julio Nogu~s, Patents
and Pharmaceutical Drugs: Understanding the Pressures on Developing Countries, J. WORLD
TRADE, Dec. 1990, at 81.
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initiate an investigation.' 7 8 The PMA complained in its petition179
that the existing Thai Patent Act specifically excluded pharmaceutical
products; 180 that the patent term of fifteen years was too short; that
the compulsory licensing provisions were excessively broad; and that
the Thai law contained unsatisfactory working requirements.1 8 1 The
U.S.-based PMA companies estimated that they suffered losses of be-
tween $16 and 24 million in 1988 alone because of inadequate patent
protection in Thailand. 1 2 The Section 301 complaint followed a simi-
lar complaint made in 1987 that had resulted in the reduction of bene-
fits available to Thailand under the GSP program.18
3
Thailand's basic position on pharmaceuticals was that new legisla-
tion would be introduced to amend the Patent Act, but that the new
legislation would reflect the standards adopted at the Uruguay Round
of negotiations.18 4 However, the Thais agreed to implement tempo-
rary measures to ease U.S. concerns, pending finalization of the Uru-
guay Round.185 The United States found the proposed interim
protection unacceptable.' 86
In February 1992, revisions to the Patent Act, designed to meet
some of the U.S. complaints, were enacted.1 87 The revisions provide
that the Patent Act will include pharmaceuticals and that the length of
protection will be extended to twenty years.18 8 The proposed revisions
include a grace period of 180 days before the legislation takes effect,
178. Initiation of Section 302 Investigation and Request for Public Comment; Thailand Pat-
ent Protection, 56 Fed. Reg. 11,815 (U.S. Trade Rep. 1991). See also Patent Protection For
Pharmaceuticals - USTR Accepts PMA's Petition, IP ASIA, Apr. 25, 1991, at 22; USTR Initiates
Section 301 Investigation Of Thailand's Pharmaceutical Patent Law, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
433 (Mar. 20, 1991).
179. Id. See Pharmaceutical Industry Files Petition Against Thailand Over Patent Protection,
supra note 177.
180. The Thai Patent Act specifically excludes protection for pharmaceuticals. See Anek,
supra note 135, at 175; Champon, supra note 135, at 317 n.205; O'Neill, supra note 135, at 609.
181. See O'Neill, supra note 135, at 609. For a general discussion of compulsory licensing
and working requirements, see W. R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 205-07 (2d ed.
1989).
182. Initiation of Section 302 Investigation and Request for Public Comment; Thailand Pat-
ent Protection, 56 Fed. Reg. 11,815 (U.S. Trade Rep. 1991).
183. See Champon, supra note 135, at 317; President Reagan Denies Thailand Larger GSP
Benefits, Citing Intellectual Property Record, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 96 (1989). See also supra
notes 144, 151.
184. Chavalit Uttasart, Impasse on IP Protection, IP ASIA, Mar. 17, 1989, at 17.
185. O'Neill, supra note 135, at 619.
186. O'Neill, supra note 135, at 619.
187. NLA Passes Patent Bill, Talks with U.S. to Follow, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Mar.
6, 1992, at 11; Thailand Attempts to Approve Patent Bill to Head off Future U.S. Trade Sanctions,
9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 64 (Jan. 8, 1992): Minister Puts Job on Line over U.S. Trade Reprisals,
BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Nov. 29, 1991, at 11.
188. Cabinet Likely to Decide on Key Drug Patent Issue, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Sept.
27, 1991, at 13; Patent Protection, IP ASIA, Feb. 14, 1991, at 20-21; Thailand Attempts to Approve
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although there are significant feelings in Thailand that the grace pe-
riod should be four years. 189
U.S. reaction to the proposed Patent Act amendments has been
one of disappointment. 190 In March 1992, the USTR concluded its
Section 301 investigation of Thai patent protection for pharmaceutical
products, determining that Thai patent protection was deficient and
created a burden or restriction on U.S. commerce. However, consider-
ing the then-pending Thai election, punitive action or negotiations
were to be delayed. 191
I Special 301
In 1991, Thailand became one of three countries identified as a
priority country under Special 301 for its failure to enforce copyrights
and for deficient patent protection for pharmaceuticals. 1 92 Given that
the USTR was already conducting two investigations under Section
301, no new investigation was launched.1 93 The effects of the designa-
tion were to extend the time for negotiation and to highlight the impa-
tience of the USTR with Thailand's slow pace of change.
The Thai government reaction was reserved. 194 Then Prime Min-
Patent Bill to Head off Future US. Trade Sanctions, supra note 187; U.S. Seeks Tougher Stand on
Property Protection, BANGKOK PosT WKLY. REV., Mar. 29, 1991, at 11.
189. PM To Decide On Pharmaceutical Grace Period, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REv., Nov. 8,
1991, at 12; Ministry Urges Delay In Patent Act Protection, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REv., Nov.
1, 1991, at 12; Thailand Attempts to Approve Patent Bill to Head off Future U.S. Trade Sanctions,
supra note 187. It is worth noting that recent proposals at the Uruguay Round concerning pat-
ent protection for pharmaceuticals have included a ten year transition period. U.S., EC Report
No Progress In New Talks On Uruguay Round; Some Industries Critical, 9 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 49 (Jan. 8, 1992). USTR Carla Hills has described this length of time as excessive. Presi-
dent Bush Says EC Holding Up Progress in GAT Trade Negotiations, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
99 (Jan. 15, 1992).
190. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1992 NAT'L TRADE ESTIMATES REPORT ON FOREIGN
TRADE BARRIERS 241-43 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 NAT'L TRADE ESTIMATES]; U.S. to Press
New Gov't to Amend Patent Law, BANGKOK POsT WKLY. REv., Mar. 27, 1992, at 4; USTR
Finds Against Thailand on Patents, Delays Action Until After Thai Election, 9 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 478 (Mar. 18, 1992). Thai Deputy Public Health Minister Athasith Vejjajiva has indi-
cated that the patent law revisions should be satisfactory to the United States since they comply
with international standards "such as those imposed by Canada which were recently passed in
bills." Ministry Urges Delay In Patent Act Protection, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REv., Nov. 1,
1991, at 12.
191. 1992 NAT'L TRADE ESTIMATES, supra note 190, at 242; USTR Finds Against Thailand
On Patents, Delays Action Until After Thai Election, supra note 190; US. To Press New Govern-
ment To Amend Patent Law, supra note 190.
192. Notice of Countries Identified as Priority Foreign Countries, 56 Fed. Reg. 20,060 (U.S.
Trade Rep. 1991). See also USTR Designates China, India and Thailand Most Egregious Viola-
tors Under Special 301, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 643 (May 1, 1991).
193. USTR Designates China, India and Thailand Most Egregious Violators Under Special
301, supra note 192; USTR Names India, Thailand and PRC as Priority Foreign Countries, IP
ASIA, May 30, 1991, at 10-11.
194. Alerts and Updates, IP AsIA, July 6, 1989, at 14. The article states: "Thailand has taken
strong objection to what it sees as U.S. bullying tactics on the issue of intellectual property rights;
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ister Chatichai Choonhavan was unconcerned about U.S. threats, tak-
ing the view that what the United States did not buy, Japan would. 195
Current Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun's more circumspect
stance has been to recognize that the United States is now Thailand's
largest export market and a world economic power, while at the same
time indicating that the national interest must come first.196
While it is difficult to compare how discussions have progressed
between the United States and the priority countries identified in 1991
under Special 301, it seems apparent that talks with Thailand have
been more fruitful than talks with India. India and the United States
were reportedly near a compromise on patent protection, 197 although
India has continued as a priority country in 1992 and recent talks have
not been fruitful. 198 The United States was considering trade sanc-
tions against the People's Republic of China (PRO), the other 1991
priority State, following a breakdown of talks on improving the intel-
lectual property protection for U.S. products in China;199 however, a
last minute compromise has apparently been worked out.2°° The PRC
was not listed as a priority country in 1992, although Taiwan was.20'
Taiwan and the United States have recently reached an agreement on
the protection of intellectual property rights.20 2
In 1992, Thailand continued to be identified as a "priority foreign
country" under Special 301. 203 However, with the political uncer-
tainty following the short-lived Suchinda administration, many as-
pects of Thai-U.S. relations, including trade law, are on hold. A
far from having the desired effect, the threat of trade sanctions appears to be encouraging a mood
of defiance." Id.
195. Chavalit Uttasart, Impasse on IP Protection, IP ASIA, Mar. 17, 1989, at 17.
196. USTR Names India, Thailand and PRC as Priority Foreign Countries, supra note 193, at
10-11.
197. Hamish McDonald, The Late Convert, FAR E. ECON. REv., Dec. 5, 1991, at 64-65.
India has long been one of the countries opposed to the U.S. goal of introducing the intellectual
property regime into the GATT system. See generally Peter Gakunu, Intellectual Property: Per-
spective of the Developing World, 19 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 358 (1989); Pravin Anand, India:
Assessing TRIPS - Developed vs. Developing Countries, IP ASIA, Jan. 10, 1991, at 7-9.
198. Patent Protection Talks With India Not Close to Breakthrough, Official Says, 9 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1223 (July 15, 1992).
199. U.S. Takes First Steps on Sanctions Against Chinese Goods Under Special 301, 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1754 (Dec. 4, 1991).
200. Last-Minute Reprieve - Again, AIAWEEK, Jan. 31, 1992, at 51; Lincoln Kaye &
Susumu Awanohara, Down To The Wire, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 30, 1992, at 37-38.
201. USTR Cites India, Taiwan, Thailand as Worst Intellectual Property Offenders, 9 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 784 (May 6, 1992).
202. U.S., Taiwan Reach Key Agreement on Patent, Trademarks, Copyright, 9 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1001 (June 10, 1992).
203. USTR Cites India, Taiwan, Thailand as Worst Intellectual Property Offenders, supra
note 201.
[Vol. 14:90
U.S-THAILAND TRADE DISPUTES
deadline of October 1992 has been established by the USTR to review
progress on the pharmaceutical patent protection issue.
204
Opposition to Changing Thailand's Intellectual Property Law
In 1987, the Thai government responded to U.S. pressure to pro-
vide for stronger copyright enforcement and penalties by putting
amendments to the Copyright Act before the legislature. However,
significant opposition arose to the proposed legislation with a political
intensity that resulted in an election, a new coalition government, and
a reexamination of the entire copyright issue.205 The strongest opposi-
tion came from those arguing that change to Thailand's intellectual
property laws amounted to capitulation to U.S. bullying. 206 Two years
later Prime Minister Chatichai's defiance of the United States on the
GSP issue was widely supported in Thailand. Thailand accepted cuts
in GSP benefits from the United States rather than altering its intellec-
tual property laws. 207
The prevailing view in Thailand is that the government should not
yield to U.S. pressure on intellectual property rights. For example, the
government minister responsible for negotiating with the United
States during 1991 was referred to as a "traitor" for allegedly yielding
to U.S. demands.20 8
In the pharmaceutical area, those opposed to change in the Patent
Act, such as the Thai Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
(TPMA), argue that foreign drug monopolies will take over the Thai
market and this will lead to higher prices and a reduction in the availa-
bility of drugs to the poor.209 Other arguments against the Patent Act
amendments can be raised, such as questioning the necessity of in-
creasing intellectual property protection for U.S. nationals when they
already hold more patents, trademarks, and copyrights in Thailand
than Thais, and bemoaning the increased outflow of royalties to be
204. Dylan MacLeod, U.S. Trade Pressures and Development of Intellectual Property Law
of Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
205. See SATHiRATHAI, supra note 1, at 25; O'Neill, supra note 135, at 617-22. Following a
change in government there was an unwillingness to reintroduce the revised copyright law. Im-
passe On IP Protection, supra note 195.
206. See O'Neill, supra note 135, at 621.
207. See supra note 151.
208. Cabinet Likely to Decide on Key Drug Patent Issue, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REv., Sept.
27, 1991, at 13; United Stance Needed Against U.S.-Minister, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., May
24, 1991, at 13. See also Some Progress but Is It Enough?, IP AsiA, Aug. 9, 1990, at 17-18.
209. USTR Names India, Thailand and PRC as Priority Foreign Countries, supra note 193;
Patent Protection, IP AsIA, Feb. 14, 1991, at 21. See also O'Neill, supra note 135, at 621. Signifi-
cant opposition existed to the recently enacted revisions of the patent law. The opposition ex-
isted not only outside the Thai government but also within the Thai government. See Thailand
Attempts to Approve Patent Bill to Head Off Future U.S. Trade Sanctions, supra note 187.
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expected with enhanced intellectual property protection, 210 but these
are not significant positions taken by opponents to change in Thailand.
EVALUATING THE SECTION 301 EXPERIENCE
It is tempting to evaluate the Section 301 experience by determin-
ing whether its use has led to changes that benefit the United States.
However, it is more appropriate to evaluate the Section 301 experience
by looking from both the Thai and U.S. point of view. Four specific
criteria can be used: short term economics; long term economics; im-
pact on the international regime (GATT); and short term political
impact.
Short-Term Economics
From the U.S. point of view, the operation of Section 301 and its
threat of embargoes has had an immediate positive economic effect.
The Thai cigarette embargo was removed and Thailand's intellectual
property laws and practices are being altered to comply with the U.S.
demands. U.S. companies can anticipate an immediate economic re-
turn. The immediate economic effect in Thailand of changes forced
upon it by U.S. use of Section 301 is one of expected increased cost for
certain pharmaceutical drugs, increased government expenditures on
enforcement of intellectual property law, and loss of monopoly control
over cigarettes. There will also be an increase in royalty payments
made to the United States because of increased intellectual property
protection. The Thais will derive little short-term economic benefit
from the changes made in response to Section 301 action.
Moreover, there exists resentment about the one-sided nature of
the U.S. Section 301 policy. 21 1 The United States uses economic coer-
cion to force change on Thailand, yet Thailand can expect no reciproc-
ity from the United States when internal U.S. policies are in question,
such as subsidized rice exports that unfairly disadvantage Thai rice
producers.212
Long-Term Economics
In the long-term, Thailand may be able to see some positive eco-
nomic impacts from adopting the U.S. recommendations. Free trade,
even in cigarettes, from the traditional economic point of view will
lead to a more efficient resource allocation.
210. Champon, supra note 135, at 331-32. See also O'Neill, supra note 135, at 620-22.
211. See generally Bhagwati, supra note 25, at 1, 15-28 and text accompanying note 25.
212. See supra note 1.
[Vol. 14:90
US.-THAILAND TRADE DISPUTES
As an economic matter, some conclude that the protection of intel-
lectual property rights, including patent protection for pharmaceuti-
cals, should lead to substantial long-term benefits in the form of
increased investment and developing technology.213 Moreover, it can
be argued that if Thailand is to emerge as one of the newly industrial-
ized countries, its intellectual property laws and practice must be
brought into line with those of industrialized countries. The problem
is that it is unclear whether industrialization precedes, or follows, in-
tellectual property protection. The prevailing view appears to be that
increased intellectual property protection leads to increased invest-
ment and economic development.214 However, it is difficult to recon-
cile this approach with the experiences of Japan, Taiwan, and Hong
Kong. For example, Japan did not recognize certain types of patents
until 1975,215 although today it is one of the strongest supporters of
U.S. efforts. As one author has commented:
Though apparently it cost them international respect at the time, the
Japanese policy of tolerating the copying of imports appears to have
benefitted their economy in the early period of development without pro-
ducing long-term negative effects. Looking at the Japanese experience, a
country presently in the early stages of development might choose a sim-
ilar course. 216
It is worth noting that one study determined that the degree of intel-
lectual property rights protection afforded by Thailand matches its
current stage of economic development.21 7
Impact on the International Regime
Where the international trading system is weak, as it allegedly is in
intellectual property protection and trade dispute resolution, it can be
argued that U.S. unilateralism will lead the way in developing new and
necessary responses to these issues.218 Section 301 results in pressure
to agree in areas where a lack of international discipline is, in the long
term, capable of undermining the entire international trading system.
213. See Richard T. Rapp & Richard P. Rozek, Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property
Protection in Developing Countries, J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1990, at 75. Cf. Carlos A. P. Braga,
The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GAYT: A View from the South, 22 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243 (1989).
214. See Rapp & Rozek, supra note 213. Cf Braga, supra note 213.
215. See TERUO Dol, THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW OF JAPAN 9-11 (1980); Carter
Mackley, The Role of the Patent System in Technology Transfer The Japanese Experience, 26
COL. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 131 (1987) (describing the evolution of the patent system to meet the
changing needs of the Japanese economy as it moved from a developing to a highly developed
economy).
216. Mackley, supra note 215, at 165.
217. See Rapp & Rozek, supra note 213, at 82.
218. See Hudec, supra note 27, at 151-53.
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As evidenced in the U.S.-Thai cigarette dispute, Section 301 forces
a foreign country to utilize the GATT dispute settlement process or
face U.S. retaliation. While increased use of the GATT dispute settle-
ment process is not inherently bad, the deadlines on GATT adjudica-
tion and compliance imposed under the U.S. law are unrealistic.
More importantly, the United States itself does not comply with
the standards, nor does it easily accept adverse GATT rulings.219 Re-
garding intellectual property, it is argued that a new approach is nec-
essary to increase standards of protection. However, the United States
is clearly unhappy with the results that are emerging from the Uru-
guay Round of negotiations 220 and has shown less interest in an inter-
national approach, having realized that certain U.S. laws and practices
may have to be altered.221
Moreover, the perceived success of U.S. bilateralism has removed
some of the urgency for an international solution.222 Thailand may be
able to see the argument that weaknesses in the international trading
system, as identified by the United States, must be corrected to
strengthen the system. This may be particularly important regarding
the rules of GATT, rules which benefit Thailand in securing market
access in countries like the United States. Alternatively, Thailand
may view the U.S. employment of Section 301 as "aggressive unilater-
alism" such that use of Section 301 will embolden the United States to
disregard the international trade law system whenever it is
inconvenient.
Short-Term Political Impact
U.S. pressure on Thailand regarding intellectual property protec-
tion may have created significant short-term political costs in Thai-
land. As previously noted, there is significant opposition to Thailand's
perceived capitulation to U.S. pressure. The current unelected Thai
government is in a position of not having to respond directly to such
219. See id. at 138-44. This author notes: "The serious discrepancy between the standards of
Regular 301 and the actual legal behavior of the United States.. ." particularly respecting the
implementation of GAIT rulings. Id. at 142. He concludes: "The heart of the problem is the
tendency of Congress to regard itself as immune from rules it writes for others." Id.
220. U.S. Chamber of Commerce Cites Flaws in Draft GA T7 Accord; Other Reaction Mixed,
9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 110 (Jan. 15, 1992).
221. See Cottier, supra note 143, at 389.
222. One commentator has noted:
The United States.. .used to consider a comprehensive deal on TRIPs as one of its priorities.
The current U.S. position is perhaps less enthusiastic as Washington increasingly solves
many pressing TRIPs issues through bilateral channels.
M. M. Kostecki, Sharing Intellectual Property Between the Rich and the Poor, 13 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 271, 273 (1991).
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pressure. With elections coming, a politician's stance on standing up
to U.S. pressure could be important. Moreover, former military leader
General Suchinda Kraprayoon expressed irritation with the U.S. gov-
ernment's perceived meddling in Thai internal matters and has been
quoted as saying that the United States was not the "world's big boss,"
and that "if I were the Thai Government, I would not allow the U.S.
to treat me this way."' 2 2 3 It has been speculated that the United States
has softened its stand on Thai intellectual property issues because of
the fear that resentment of any U.S. action could lead to greater polit-
ical instability.224
CONCLUSION
The United States has relied upon the notorious Section 301 trade
remedy in its relations with Thailand on cigarettes and intellectual
property. With cigarettes, the threat of trade retaliation was used to
obtain the agreement of Thailand to utilize the third party dispute set-
tlement procedures of the GATT to resolve the bilateral dispute re-
specting Thai import restrictions. The result of the GATT process
was a removal of the import barriers to foreign cigarettes. Regarding
intellectual property, the threat of trade retaliation has been employed
to pressure the Thai government to change its domestic intellectual
property laws and practices to benefit U.S. interests.
From the U.S. perspective, Section 301 has been successfully uti-
lized to further its short and long term economic and international
interests. However, it is clear that utilization of Section 301 against
Thailand has not been without its costs. Resentment of U.S. pressure
tactics has created an anti-U.S. political constituency in Thailand
where none had existed and has created significant problems for the
civilian government as Thailand seeks to regain democratic processes.
The resentment is increased because of the one-sided nature of the
U.S. action-demanding changes from Thailand without rectifying
U.S. inadequacies and GATT inconsistencies that are detrimental to
Thai interests. The unilateral nature of the U.S. action does not create
confidence in international rules upon which Thailand is dependent.
The perception in Thailand, regardless of how the dispute is por-
trayed by the United States, is of a stronger, more powerful friend
publicly bullying its smaller, more vulnerable partner into complying
with unwanted laws and practices. It is a perception that will not be
readily forgotten in The Land of Smiles.
223. The Reluctant Leader, FAR E. ECON. RFv., Nov. 14, 1991, at 20.
224. Chanda, supra note 172, at 5.
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